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Second Chance For Ex-Partner’s Parenting Claim
Manhattan appeals court open to argument regarding adoption after a breakup
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
I n just the latest in a series of cases dat-ing back more than a quarter century grappling with questions about parental standing within unmarried same-sex 
couples, a New York State appellate court has 
revived a lawsuit by Kelly Gunn, who is seeking 
joint custody of a child adopted by her former 
partner, Circe Hamilton.
On June 26, a fi ve-judge panel of the Appel-
late Division’s Manhattan-based First Depart-
ment reversed an April dismissal of the case 
by Supreme Court Justice Frank Nervo, who 
had found that that despite her close relation-
ship with the child, Gunn was not a “parent” 
under New York’s Domestic Relations Law and 
so lacked “standing” to sue for custody or visi-
tation.
The unanimous appellate panel, in an opin-
ion by Justice Judith J. Gische, found that 
Gunn should have another chance to call on 
the court’s “equitable powers” to recognize her 
relationship with the child.
Some background on New York courts’ treat-
ment of same-sex parent issues is in order. In 
1991, the state’s highest bench, the Court of Ap-
peals, in Alison D. v. Virginia M., established 
an unfortunate precedent that only a person 
related to the child by blood or adoption has 
standing to seek custody or court-ordered visi-
tation. In the years that followed, the New York 
courts repeatedly confronted cases of same-sex 
couples raising a child together but then break-
ing up, with the birth or adoptive parent resist-
ing their former partner’s attempt to continue 
in a parental role. The former partners in those 
cases found no relief from the state’s courts.
In her dissent in that case, then-Chief Judge 
Judith Kaye argued the decision failed to take 
account of the reality of non-traditional fami-
lies, including those headed by LGBTQ couples, 
and would ultimately be harmful to the best in-
terests of the children.
That shortcoming in addressing same-sex 
parenting issues was fi nally addressed by the 
Court of Appeals in August 2016, in its deci-
sion in Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A. C. C, where 
it focused on a written agreement between two 
women who had a child through donor insemi-
nation and shared parenting responsibilities 
until the couple split up. There, the high court 
determined that the second parent should have 
standing to seek custody or visitation so the 
court could make a determination based on the 
child’s best interests.
The court’s opinion in Brooke S.B., written by 
the late Judge Sheila Abdus-Salaam, was nar-
row and cautious, tailored to the facts of that 
case, and leaving open what other theories sec-
ond parents could pursue to have their stand-
ing recognized.
In one case decided shortly after Brooke S.B., 
the court accepted what is called a “judicial es-
toppel” theory, because the birth mother had 
originally sued her former partner for child sup-
port, alleging she had a parental obligation, but 
later sought to deny the other woman stand-
ing to assert parental rights. The birth mother 
was not allowed to take those two inconsistent 
positions. In that case, the two women had not 
made a formal written agreement, but the for-
mer partner’s standing was recognized.
Gunn and Hamilton, together beginning in 
2004, agreed in 2007 to pursue an interna-
tional adoption and raise a child together as 
a family. The plan was for Hamilton to adopt 
overseas and bring the child home to New York, 
and that Gunn would then complete a “second 
parent” adoption. The women’s romantic rela-
tionship ended in December 2009, before any 
adoption had taken place. The following year, 
Gunn and Hamilton, with the assistance of 
lawyers, signed a separation agreement divid-
ing up their assets.
Despite this breakup, the women remained 
friends, and Hamilton continued to pursue an 
adoption, with Gunn’s encouragement. In the 
summer of 2011, Hamilton adopted a child, and 
Gunn, in Europe on business, met Hamilton 
and the child in London and the three returned 
to New York together. 
Hamilton allowed Gunn frequent contact 
with the child, with whom Gunn formed an at-
tachment. In August 2016, just as the Court of 
Appeals was overruling the Alison D. decision 
in the Brooke S.B. case, Hamilton, a British na-
tive, announced she was moving back to Eng-
land with the child. Gunn quickly sprang into 
action, fi ling her lawsuit and seeking a tempo-
rary order requiring Hamilton to remain in New 
York with the child while the case was litigated. 
Gunn claimed that under Brooke S.B., she had 
standing to seek joint custody and visitation 
rights based on the women’s 2007 agreement.
Justice Nervo did not dismiss the case out-
right and there was a temporary order placed 
on Hamilton, but after a lengthy trial — dur-
ing which he reviewed the extensive record of 
communications between the two women in 
the period immediately preceding the adoption 
— he determined that the 2007 agreement had 
not survived their breakup. By the time Hamil-
ton adopted the child, he found, she was acting 
on her own. Nervo concluded that Gunn was a 
friend who had formed an attachment with the 
child, but not a “parent” within the meaning of 
the Domestic Relations Law.
The decision proved controversial from the 
moment it was announced, particularly in 
light of the judicial estoppel fi nding the Court 
of Appeals made in the post-Brooke S.B. case 
discussed above. Even in the absence of an ex-
press agreement, a court could recognize pa-
rental standing, according to the state’s high-
est bench. Gunn argued that this was such a 
case.
Writing for the Appellate Division, Judge 
Gische found that this may be the kind of case 
where equitable estoppel — based on whether 
Gunn had assumed a suffi ciently parental role 
toward the child, with the consent or at least ac-
quiescence of Hamilton — is appropriate. While 
agreeing with Nervo that the couple’s breakup 
meant the case did not come squarely within 
the holding of Brooke S.B., the appellate panel 
found that both sides should have the oppor-
tunity to present evidence about whether equi-
table estoppel applies here.
Should Nervo conclude that Gunn has stand-
ing to sue using an equitable estoppel theory, 
he would then have to consider the child’s best 
interests. A “guardian ad litem” could be ap-
pointed to represent the child’s interests.
Gunn asked to have the case assigned to a 
different judge, but the Appellate Division de-
clined to do so, without explanation.
Gunn is represented by Robbie Kaplan and 
her law fi rm, Kaplan & Company, as well as law-
yers from Morrison Cohen and Chemtob Moss 
& Forman. Hamilton is represented by law-
yers from Cohen Rabin Stine Schumann. The 
LGBT Law Association Foundation of Greater 
New York submitted an amicus brief to the 
court, with pro bono assistance from Latham & 
Watkins, not taking sides between the parties 
but discussing possible routes for applying the 
Brooke S.B. case to this new situation
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Appelllate Division Associate Justice Judith J. Gische.
